The narrative over the second half of the season and into the playoffs of the 2018 Patriots was the emergence of the running game as the engine that drove the offense. For the entirety of the Brady/Belichick epoch the understanding was that the offense ran through Brady and the running game was supplemental. However, this year, the team was forced to pivot, as the lack of viable receiving options and health of Tom Brady forced their hand into handing the ball off more. I went back and looked at every year Tom has been the starter and the facts are more interesting than you’d think.
2001- Team stats- 473/1793/15/3.8. Ran 50% of the time.
2002- Team stats- 395/1508/9/3.8. Ran 40% of the time.
2003- Team Stats- 473/1607/9/3.4. Ran 47% of the time.
2004- Team Stats- 524/2134/15/4.1. Ran 52% of the time.
2005- Team Stats- 439/1512/16/3.4. Ran 44% of the time.
2006- Team Stats- 499/1969/20/3.9. Ran 49% of the time.
2007- Team Stats- 451/1849/17/4/1. Ran 43% of the time.
2009- Team Stats- 466/1921/19/4.1. Ran 44% of the time.
2010- Team Stats- 454/1973/19/4.3. Ran 47% of the time.
2011- Team Stats- 438/1764/18/4.0. Ran 42% of the time.
2012- Team Stats- 523/2184/25/4.2. Ran 45% of the time.
2013- Team Stats- 470/2065/19/4.4. Ran 43% of the time.
2014- Team Stats- 438/1727/13/3.9. Ran 42% of the time.
2015- Team Stats- 383/1404/14/3.7. Ran 38% of the time.
2016- Team Stats- 482/1872/19/3.9. Ran 47% of the time.
2017- Team Stats- 448/1889/16/4.2. Ran 43% of the time.
2018- Team Stats- 478/2037/18/4.3. Ran 45% of the time.
The one thing that really stuck out to me is the consistency of the amount of attempts. With the exception of 2002 and the abysmal 2015 season, the team has averaged around 450 attempts a year and ran the ball on average 44% of the time. It was interesting to see that the team has been productive running the ball, averaging around 4 yards a carry with the exception of a handful of years. What really stood out to me, however, is the potential narrative shift that this was the year the Pats transformed from a pass first to a run first offense. I contend that it started last year based on the numbers.
Dion Lewis surprised everybody last year by proving that he could be an every down back and an effective runner both between the tackles and on the edge. While the number of attempts dipped from 2016 to 2017, the average yards per attempt and total yards went up while running less.
This year, with Lewis in Tennessee, the go to back was a…rookie? A rookie who missed all of the preseason due to knee surgery, who treated September as his preseason while missing three games ran for 930 yards and 6 touchdowns while averaging 4.5 YPC?
From 2017 to 2018 there was a slight increase in attempts and subsequently yards. But they only ran it 2% more of the time in 18′ as they did in 17′. So the nationwide theory that the team had to rely heavily on the run game for the first time since 2004 this year is false. The change started in 2017. Everyone just blindly agreed that they became a run first offense this year due to the fact that the passing game wasn’t as effective as it had been in the past (which is a hefty goal considering this offense has consistently been a top 3 offense for nearly 20 years).
Sony Michel was a godsend this year. He no doubt helped guide this offense through the regular and postseason, and they do not win the Super Bowl without him. He is a fantastic player who will be a great running back for years to come. However, lets look at 2017 as the year the shift started, not 2018.
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